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NOTES
Dirty Digits
THE COLLECTION OF POST-CUT-THROUGH DIALED
DIGITS UNDER THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE
INTRODUCTION
Telephone users commonly pay outstanding bills or verify bank
account balances by navigating an automated system and entering the
appropriate digits. In some cases, a caller might dial digits to input
personal information, such as a social security number or a pin number to
access confidential accounts.1 Nevertheless, many telephone users would
be disturbed to learn that law enforcement agencies may record and store
indefinitely all of the digits dialed from a specific telephone without a
warrant, without notification to the user, and without a showing of
probable cause.2
The device that enables law enforcement agencies to collect the
outgoing digits a telephone user dials is called a pen register.3 Though at
one time pen registers exclusively monitored telephones, today pen
registers monitor communications conducted over a variety of electronic
media.4 In the case of telephones, a pen register can record both the digits
dialed to connect a telephone call to its destination and the digits dialed
after connection occurs, such as those dialed to navigate automated

1

In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
328 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Because the names of the published orders this Note discusses are unwieldy,
this Note will refer to the orders by the jurisdiction in which they were decided. Where a district has
published more than one order, roman numerals indicate the chronological order in which the orders
were issued.
2
See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 180 (1998).
3
Id. at 117. Pen registers perform the inverse function of trap-and-trace devices, which
collect information about all calls received by a particular telephone. Id. The Pen/Trap Statute
regulates both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006)
(“Pen/Trap Statute”). The statutory definition of a pen register is located in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
(“Definition”) and discussed in more detail in Parts I.A and I.C.
4
See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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menus.5 These latter digits are known as “post-cut-through dialed digits”
(“PCTDDs”).6
To date, researchers have failed to develop technology that can
effectively screen PCTDDs that contain a telephone user’s substantive
information, such as account or PIN numbers, from PCTDDs that do not
contain substantive information, such as digits the user dials after being
connected to a calling card company, which are technically PCTDDs but
may also represent the actual destination of the telephone call.7
Therefore, when using a pen register to collect all digits dialed by a
particular telephone user, law enforcement agencies inevitably collect all
PCTDDs dialed by the user to navigate automated systems, even when
those digits contain the user’s substantive information.
Between 2006 and 2008, six courts issued pen register orders
denying the government’s application to install and use a pen register to
collect all PCTDDs dialed by a subject telephone.8 Principally, this Note
extracts from this series of pen register orders the three unique
interpretations of the Pen/Trap Statute that informed the courts’
conclusions. Next, by analyzing those three perspectives in light of both
the statutory text and the legislative history of the Pen/Trap Statute, this
Note ultimately argues that the collection of PCTDDs that contain the
substantive content of telephone users’ communications runs afoul of

5

See infra Part I.A. for a more detailed discussion of pen registers. See also U.S.
Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
6
In re United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register
and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone
Tracking (S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
7
In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d at 332
n.5; see also U.S. Telecom, 227 F.3d at 462 (“Some post-cut-through dialed digits are telephone
numbers, such as when a subject places a calling card, credit card, or collect call by first dialing a
long-distance carrier access number and then, after the initial call is ‘cut through,’ dialing the
telephone number of the destination party.”).
8
Each published pen register order denied a law enforcement agency’s application to
record all digits dialed from a specific telephone using a pen register. See In re United States for an
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing
Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), No. 08 MC
0595, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364, at *15-*16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008); In re United States for
an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices (E.D.N.Y. II), No.
08-308, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97359, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2008); In re United States for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2)
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info. (S.D. Tex. II), No. H-07-613, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77635, at *34-*35 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007); E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339; In re
Application of United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking
(S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of an Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (order
affirming partial denial of application for the installation and use of pen register and trap and trade
device). To date, no court has published an order granting such a request, although presumably such
orders are granted routinely.
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both the Pen/Trap Statute and the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution9 and should be prohibited.
Specifically, in Part I, this Note briefly reviews relevant
background information about pen register technology, as well as the
common-law and statutory provisions that restrict the use of pen registers
and the collection of content by law enforcement agencies. In Part II, this
Note emphasizes the interplay between two provisions of the Pen/Trap
Statute—18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 3123(7)—which has given
rise to the three prominent and conflicting interpretations of the Pen/Trap
Statute. By viewing these interpretations in light of traditional canons of
statutory interpretation and the statute’s legislative history, Part II
concludes that the Pen/Trap Statute should not be viewed as authorizing
the use of pen registers to collect PCTDDs that contain content.
Specifically, because the Fourth Amendment most likely protects
PCTDDs that contain content, the canon of constitutional avoidance
suggests that future courts should interpret the Pen/Trap Statute to
prohibit the collection of PCTDDs that contain content.
Building on Part II’s discussion, Part III.A presents this Note’s
primary conclusion, which is that the statutory ambiguity should be
cured by either amending or eliminating 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). Part III.B
briefly summarizes suggestions made by other commentators who have
advocated general amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute. Finally, Part IV
reemphasizes the conclusion that the collection of content in the form of
PCTDDs is unconstitutional and urges Congress to take steps to prevent
the continuation of this practice.
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEN REGISTERS AND THE
COLLECTION OF CONTENT

Part I.A explains what a pen register is and traces its evolution
from a device that originally assisted telephone service providers in the
ordinary course of business, to a tool that law enforcement agencies
routinely employ during investigations. Part I.B explores judicial
limitations imposed on the government’s ability to intercept the content
of electronic communications, including its use of pen registers, in a
series of Supreme Court decisions. These decisions in turn have
informed Congressional action with respect to pen registers, including
the original passage of and later amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute,
which Part I.C addresses in detail. The brief review of this well-trodden
history sets the stage for Part II’s analysis of the recent pen register
orders and the Pen/Trap Statute’s ambiguous text.
9

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
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Identifying a Pen Register

Telephone service providers use pen registers in the ordinary
course of business to perform monthly billing operations and to prevent
illegal and fraudulent uses of telephone lines.10 Yet, as a result of the
inherent value of the information that pen registers collect, pen registers
are also important for law enforcement agencies conducting
investigations into criminal activities.11 No available statistics tabulate
the total number of pen register applications approved in the United
States for law enforcement agents.12 However, one commentator
estimated that in 2007 alone, that figure was at least 60,000.13
Whether or not a particular device is a pen register depends on
the exact capabilities of the device in light of the statutory definition of a
pen register.14 Because technology and statutes constantly evolve,
judicial conceptions15 and statutory definitions16 of a pen register have
also changed over time.17 The current statutory definition of a pen
register contains expansive language that resulted from amendments
intended to allow pen registers to monitor activities conducted over a
variety of digital mediums, including digital telephones, cellular phones,
digital pagers, Internet browsing, and electronic mail.18 Yet, the earliest
10

United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977). Providers of electronic or
wire communication services may continue to use pen registers in the ordinary course of business as
a result of an exception codified in the Pen/Trap Statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (2006).
11
See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 177-78 (acknowledging congressional intent to treat the
pen register as a permissible law enforcement tool); see also 86 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 198, No. 03406 at *2 (Dec. 18, 2003) (“The placement of pen registers and trap and trace devices allows law
enforcement officers to obtain such information as the names of suspects in an investigation, the
identities and relationship between individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activity, especially
in conspiracies, and the location of fugitives.”).
12
Pen registers are approved on an individual basis by courts pursuant to ex parte
requests by law enforcement agents. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a). The Pen/Trap Statute imposes an
obligation on the Attorney General to report to Congress each year the total number of pen registers
for which agents of the DOJ applied. 18 U.S.C. § 3126. However, these reports are not publicly
available and other authors have been unable to obtain them despite thorough efforts. See, e.g.,
Robert Ditzion, Electronic Surveillance in The Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1321, 1347 n.162 (2004). Most evidence of the total number of pen register
applications granted appears to be anecdotal. See Giardi, infra note 13, at 554; see also Carl S.
Kaplan, Concern Over Proposed Changes in Internet Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/technology/21CYBERLAW.html/?ex=1236315
600&en=c0400d2e20c62f91&ei=5070 (quoting former DOJ trial attorney who claimed to use pen
registers to obtain non-content “hundreds of times”) (on file with author).
13
Albert Giardi, Jr., Companies Caught in the Middle, Keynote Address, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 554 (2007).
14
Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 982-86 (1996) (discussing the evolution of the pen register).
15
See infra Part I.B.
16
See infra Part I.C.
17
See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 982-86.
18
See infra Part I.C; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘pen register’
means a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication
is transmitted . . . .”).
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devices that Congress and courts considered to be pen registers lacked
this wide scope of functions.
The primitive pen register of the 1960s attached to a telephone
line and then generated a paper tape on which it printed dashes that
correlated to the outgoing numbers the user dialed.19 Because at that time
telephone users only used telephones to place phone calls, many believed
that any device that detected the digits dialed to connect a call could not
reveal the substantive information the user communicated during the
call.20 Understandably, laws and attitudes failed to anticipate how the
nature and use of communication devices, including telephones, would
evolve and expand in the decades to follow.21
Today, telephones serve many purposes aside from facilitating
conversation.22 Similarly, a proliferation of digital devices with complex
and innovative capabilities can monitor far more about a single telephone
call than merely the digits the user dialed. Devices can easily capture the
“time, date, and duration” of calls.23 In the case of a cellular telephone
user, a pen register can supply information that can be used to calculate
the user’s physical location or track the user’s movements in real time.24
Litigation has tested the outer boundaries of what devices are properly
considered to be pen registers. For instance, plaintiffs have challenged
the use by law enforcement agencies of pen registers to clone a suspect’s
pager,25 track a suspect’s web site activity,26 or monitor the flow of e-mail
traffic into and away from a particular e-mail account.27 In resolving
plaintiffs’ claims, courts have crafted their views of which devices may
qualify as pen registers in light of the statutory text. One court, for
instance, speculated that a device that allowed its operator to eavesdrop
on actual telephone conversations could fall within the statutory
definition of a pen register, so long as the eavesdropping function was
19

See, e.g., United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
20
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977).
21
See In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap
and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d,
325 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no
protection against such invasions of individual security?”).
22
For instance, the Apple i-Phone allows its user to browse the Internet, e-mail,
download music, and utilize maps with GPS tracking, in addition to other features. See AppleiPhone-Features, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
23
Freiwald, supra note 14, at 986.
24
The use of pen registers to track telephone users in real time is also controversial. See,
e.g., Timothy Stapleton, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell Location Data:
Is the Whole More than the Sum of its Parts?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (recommending
that the Pen/Trap Statute be amended to prevent the use of a pen register to collect cell site data
without a showing of probable cause).
25
Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1995).
26
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008).
27
Warshak v.United States., 532 F.3d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 2008).
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inactive.28 Another court concluded that a device that monitored the URL
addresses that the defendant visited, as well as the e-mail addresses of
those to whom he sent messages, was a pen register.29 Recently, another
court concluded that a device that collected content was statutorily
precluded from being a pen register, even if the government stipulated
that it would only decode pre-cut-through dialed digits.30
In short, the classification of a device as a pen register is
primarily functional, but not exclusively so. The analysis depends not
only on the capabilities of a specific device in light of the statutory
definition of a pen register, but also turns on the philosophy of the
particular court applying that language to a particular device.
Accordingly, both Congress and the courts play significant roles in
determining whether a device is a pen register.31 Parts I.B and I.C explore
those roles, respectively.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Content, Non-Content, and
Pen Registers

The current statutory definition of a pen register provides that the
information that a pen register records or decodes “shall not include the
contents of any communication.”32 The term “contents”33 is a legal term
of art with a meaning developed over time through both case law and
legislation. In simplistic terms, the content of a particular electronic
communication includes the substantive aspects of that communication,
as distinguished from those attributes of the communication that relate
exclusively to its facilitation.34 The digits dialed to connect a telephone
call, the delivery address written on the outside of a mailed envelope,35 or
the email address of the user to whom an email is sent36 all exemplify
attributes that facilitate a communication, but which ordinarily do not
reveal the substantive content of the communication.
28

People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 737 (N.Y. 1998) (concluding that if a device’s
digital and audio functions were “sufficiently discrete” and there was a “remote” likelihood of
misuse, the presence of audio-capable technology would not disqualify the device from use as a pen
register).
29
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 504.
30
In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and
Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced
By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), No. 08 MC 0595, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364, at *8-*9 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2008).
31
See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 985-86.
32
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
33
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
34
Susan Freiwald usefully distinguishes between communication content and
communication attributes. See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 953 (“[A]ttributes [of a communication]
include the existence, duration and . . . the identities of the parties to it, their physical locations and
their electronic addresses.”).
35
See, e.g., United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979).
36
See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
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This understanding of content can be traced back to 1967, when
the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States37 that the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause requirement applied to the substantive
aspects of a telephone communication if the speaker’s expectation of
privacy in his conversation was reasonable.38 The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”39 In Katz, the Court considered whether the
government had conducted an unreasonable search by electronically
intercepting the dialogue of a telephone call that the defendant placed on
a public telephone from within a telephone booth.40 The Court of Appeals
had concluded that the government’s action was not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because the government had not physically entered
the telephone booth in order to intercept the communication.41 The
Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, explaining that the Fourth
Amendment protects “people—and not simply ‘areas’ against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”42 The Court concluded that to apply
the Fourth Amendment more narrowly would be to “ignore the vital
role” of the telephone in modern life.43
The concurring opinion by Justice Harlan fashioned a twopronged test to determine whether a search was unreasonable.44 Courts
later adopted this test as the standard for determining the legality of a
search under the Fourth Amendment.45 Under this articulation, the Fourth
Amendment protects parties who have either an objectively legitimate
expectation of privacy, or a subjective expectation of privacy that
“society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”46 Applying this test to
the defendant’s conversation in the telephone booth, Justice Harlan
concluded that the defendant had a legitimate expectation that what he
said to the other party during the call was private.47 Since his expectation
of privacy was reasonable, the interception of the defendant’s
37

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353-54.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-50.
41
Id. at 348-49. This reasoning followed from early Supreme Court jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (concluding that warrantless wiretapping
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment unless the defendant’s physical property had been
invaded).
42
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
43
Id. at 352.
44
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); see also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (concluding that the use of thermal imagery to measure heat
emanating from within a private home constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (concluding that the warrantless
observation of a private backyard did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment).
46
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
47
See id.
38
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communication constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.48
Congress responded to the Katz decision the following year by
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,49 which provided statutory protection for the “content”50 of
communications.51 Part I.C discusses this legislation in greater detail. In
short, Title III, commonly known as the “Wiretap Act,” set forth
procedures for obtaining authorization to intercept a wire or oral
communication.52 Under Title III, after a government agent demonstrates
probable cause in a federal court, the court may issue a warrant
authorizing the government to intercept the content of a private
communication falling under Title III.53 Title III incorporated the basic
principle of Katz by defining content, “with respect to any wire, oral or
electronic communication, [as] includ[ing] any information concerning
the substance, purport or meaning of that communication.”54
In 1977, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the Court
first considered the relationship between pen registers and the “content”
protected by Title III.55 New York Telephone Company had resisted a
directive from the FBI to install pen registers on two telephone lines the
defendants used in an illegal gambling enterprise.56 Although the
government possessed probable cause to believe that the defendants used
the telephone lines illegally,57 the telephone company argued that the
district court could only order it to furnish facilities and technical
assistance to the government in connection with a wiretap order
conforming to Title III.58 The Court rejected this argument and concluded
that pen registers were not governed by Title III because they were
incapable of “intercept[ing]” the content of wire or oral
communications.59 Relying on the prevalent understanding at the time,
the Court concluded that digits dialed into a telephone lacked the
capacity to be substantive. Consequently, it followed that pen registers
posed a lesser threat to privacy than traditional wiretaps because they

48

See id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
50
Id. § 2510(8) (defining “content”).
51
Id. § 2511 (prohibiting the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications).
52
See id. §§ 2510-2522.
53
Id. § 2518(1)(a)-(f), (3).
54
Id. § 2510(8).
55
See 434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977).
56
Id. at 162.
57
Id. 161-62.
58
Id. at 162-63.
59
Title III defines “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisition” of content. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4). Because a pen register does not monitor sound, the court concluded that a pen register
cannot “intercept” content. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 166-67.
49
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could not reveal substantive information about a telephone
communication.60
In New York Telephone, the government possessed probable
cause to believe that the defendants used telephone lines illegally.61
Consequently, the Court had no occasion to rule on the minimal showing
of suspicion needed to justify the use of a pen register.62 However, the
Court answered that open question in 1979 in the case of Smith v.
Maryland.63 The defendant, Smith, appealed his robbery conviction on
the grounds that the government’s investigation included the installation
and use of a pen register to monitor his telephone use without a warrant.64
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun affirmed the decision by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland,65 and held that Fourth Amendment
protections do not apply to dialed digits.66 To reach this conclusion, the
Court applied the Katz test and concluded that a telephone user does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed numbers because the
user is aware that the telephone company monitors the numbers dialed to
connect a telephone call.67 This holding reflected a basic tenet of the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that the individual
voluntarily turns over or conveys68 to a third party.69 In revealing
information to a third party, even on the assumption that it will be kept
secret, one assumes the risk that that party may reveal that information to
the government.70
The Court identified several ways in which a telephone
subscriber receives notice that a telephone company has facilities that
enable it to document its subscribers’ dialing activities.71 The Court
60

See id. at 168.
Id. at 162.
62
See id. at 165 n.7.
63
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
64
Id. at 737.
65
Smith v. Maryland, 389 A.2d 858 (1978).
66
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
67
Id.
68
See id.
69
Id. at 743-44. Professor Orin S. Kerr refers to this principle as “the disclosure
principle.” Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 628 (2003); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561 (2009) (defending “the controversial rule that information
loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a third party”). The disclosure
principle has guided judicial decision making in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (bank depositor’s records, including checks and deposit slips);
United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979) (address information on outside of mailed
envelope); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1989) (interception of content of
telephone conversation on portable phone by radio in the vicinity).
70
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442); see also United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (discussing the disclosure principle in connection with the
seizure and search by federal agents of packages determined to contain cocaine).
71
A telephone user realizes that by dialing digits, those digits are conveyed to the
telephone company in order to complete the call. The user also receives a monthly itemized bill that
61
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emphasized that its conclusion did not rely on whether the telephone
company in fact monitored any dialed digits, but rather rested on the
petitioner’s knowledge that such a possibility existed.72 Because a
telephone user has notice of the possibility of monitoring, the use of a
telephone constitutes an assumption of risk by the user that digits dialed
will not be secret from the telephone company, which might in turn
reveal those numbers to the government.73 Even if an individual
telephone user subjectively believed that dialed digits were private, that
belief would be unreasonable and, under Katz, not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.74 Thus, the Court held that “[t]he installation and use
of a pen register . . . was not a search, and no warrant was required.”75
Smith marked the last time that the Supreme Court considered
the use of pen registers. Therefore, Smith’s holding—that the use of a
pen register does not constitute a search and therefore does not require
probable cause—remains relevant to that area of law today.76 However,
as the next subsection addresses, Congress has acted on several
occasions since Smith to craft and amend federal law in order to keep
pace with evolving technology and the specific questions raised by the
continued exception of pen registers from Title III’s warrant requirement.
C.

The Evolution of the Pen/Trap Statute

The statutory scheme that regulates the use of pen registers can
best be understood by examining in chronological order four public laws,
including Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (“Title III”),77 the Electronic Communications Protection Act of
1986 (“ECPA”),78 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (“CALEA”),79 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,80 each

lists numbers dialed. Most telephone books also notify telephone users that the telephone company
may monitor dialing activity to identify users that make improper phone calls, or to regulate or
maintain the telephone line. Thus, a telephone user is on notice of the company’s ability to monitor
dialed digits. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43. Today, these uses are statutorily preserved by an exception
in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (2006).
72
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
73
Id. at 743.
74
Id. at 743-44. The court noted, however, that its conclusions applied as a result of the
telephone company’s known practices, and therefore did not foreclose the reasonableness of the
defendant’s expectation that the content of his telephone conversation would remain private. See id.
at 743.
75
Id. at 745-46 (quotation marks omitted).
76
See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the
application of Smith to the use of pen registers to record e-mail and Internet activities).
77
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
78
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522, 3121-3127 (2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
79
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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of which directly affected the use of pen registers. This Note takes the
view that legislative history, particularly statements in committee reports
or made by a bill’s sponsor, is relevant to courts that must apply a statute
that, by its plain language, is ambiguous.81 The extent to which this sort
of evidence should influence judicial decision making is often challenged
by textualists, who take the view that the “text is the law.”82
Nevertheless, relevant examples of legislative history are interwoven
with the history that this Part presents.
The evolution of the statutory scheme that regulates electronic
surveillance, including the use of pen registers, has been fueled by
Congress’ consistent desire to keep pace with the challenges posed by
emerging technologies to traditional notions of privacy.83 By enacting
Title III in 1968, Congress took a major step forward in its effort to
protect electronic communications.84 The purpose of that bill was to
become “the primary law protecting the security and privacy of business
and personal communications.”85 However, Title III only provided
protection for “oral” or “wire” communications that could “be overheard
and understood by the human ear,”86 and which were transmitted over
“common carriers.”87
This changed in 1986 with the passage of the Electronic
Communications Protection Act.88 The ECPA amended Title III to
extend its protections to new forms of electronic communications.89
Members of Congress had become aware of dramatic technological
changes that created new risks to the privacy and security of transmitted
communications.90 The ECPA sought to prevent unauthorized
interceptions of many different electronic communications in the same
80

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
81
See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-96 (1989) (incorporating Senate and
House Committee reports to interpret an ambiguous provision of law).
82
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
22-25 (1997) (presenting “textualist” philosophy of legal interpretation); see also Blanchard, 489
U.S. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision to incorporate Senate
and House Committee reports to interpret an ambiguous provision of law).
83
As one court noted, this “history reflects persistent Congressional efforts to assure that
communications contents retain their protected legal status in the face of changing technology and
law enforcement capabilities.” S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
84
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
85
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556; see
also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972).
86
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510(1)-(2), 2511.
87
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556.
88
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522, 3121-3127 (2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
89
Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995).
90
See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556 (discussing
new forms of technology); see also Brown, 50 F.3d at 289 (reviewing the legislative history of the
passage of the ECPA).
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way that Title III had done for oral and wire communications.91 The
ECPA defined an “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.”92 This broad definition brought modern technologies, such
as the Internet and e-mail, under Title III’s purview. Consequently, law
enforcement agencies had to follow Title III’s procedures, including a
showing of probable cause,93 in order to intercept the content of any
electronic communication.
The ECPA also articulated federal guidelines for the installation
and use of pen registers.94 In 1986, Congress viewed a pen register as a
device that, in its limited capacity, could only record the telephone
numbers to which a telephone user placed calls, yet could not capture
any part of an actual telephone conversation.95 Consequently, the ECPA
established separate96 and lower97 standards for the installation and use of
pen registers than those that applied to content-intercepting devices
under Title III. The distinct sections of the ECPA that regulate pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices are referred to as the Pen/Trap
Statute.98
The standards that govern the installation and use of a pen
register under the Pen/Trap Statute differ from those that govern contentintercepting devices under Title III in four ways that are relevant to this
discussion generally, as well as to the statutory amendments that Part III
of this Note suggests.
First, Title III applications must satisfy a higher standard of
proof than pen register applications.99 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, a judge
may only issue a wiretap warrant under Title III if the judge determines
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that there is probable
cause to believe that “an individual is committing, has committed, or is

91
92
93
94
95
96

Brown, 50 F.3d at 289.
18 U.S.C § 2510(12) (2006).
See id. § 2518(1)(d), (3).
See id. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3564.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h)(i) (providing that the use of pen registers is not regulated

by Title III).
97

See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. The name “Pen/Trap Statute” derives from its dual
application to both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2, at
117.
99
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (requiring extensive disclosure incident to a wiretap
application including, among other things, full and complete statements of fact about the
investigation and any alternative procedures employed to obtain the desired information without a
wiretap), with id. § 3122(b) (requiring minimal disclosure incident to a pen register application,
limited to the identity of the applicant and the agency conducting the investigation and a certification
that the information sought is relevant to the investigation being conducted).
98
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about to commit” a qualified offense.100 In contrast, a pen register
application requires only that an attorney for the government certify to
the court in writing and under oath that “the information likely to be
obtained [by a pen register] is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation being conducted” by the official’s agency.101 The lower
standard of proof required for pen register applications is “far from
burdensome.”102
Second, if an attorney for the government or a law enforcement
official has made the proper certification to the court, then the court is
compelled to order the installation and use of a pen register.103 This
compulsory order leaves no room for judicial discretion in determining
whether or not a pen register should be issued. A wiretap application, in
contrast, is permissive. A federal judge has wide latitude for factual
review in determining whether the particular facts support authorizing
the interception of content.104
Third, the Pen/Trap Statute does not contain an exclusion
requirement. As a result of this omission, evidence obtained pursuant to
the wrongful or unlawful installation or use of a pen register may be
admitted as evidence in a criminal case.105 The statute penalizes a
knowing wrongdoer by authorizing the imposition by the court of either
a fine or prison sentence, yet it has no effect on the fruit of such
wrongdoing.106 This stands in contrast to the treatment of content
wrongfully intercepted pursuant to Title III, which may be suppressed
upon a petitioner’s motion.107
100

Id. § 2518(3)(a).
Id. § 3122(b).
102
In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
329 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 48 (2004); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in
Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1566-67 (2004) (discussing the low standard of proof for a pen
register application).
103
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1)-(2); see also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 47 (1986), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3601 (“[Section 3123(a)] does not envision an independent judicial review
of whether the application meets the relevance standard, rather the court needs only to review the
completeness of the certification submitted.”); 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The court is required to issue an order upon seeing the
prosecutor’s certification. The court is not authorized to look behind the certification to evaluate the
judgment of the prosecutor.”).
104
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (providing that upon a satisfactory Title III application, a judge
may enter a wiretap order) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d
Cir. 1999) (discussing the circumstances under which a federal judge may authorize a wiretap order).
105
See, e.g., United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant
could not show that Congress intended, either explicitly or implicitly, to provide suppression as a
remedy for violation of the Pen/Trap Statute).
106
18 U.S.C. § 3121(d).
107
See id. § 2518(10)(a) (providing aggrieved party the right to move to suppress the
fruits gathered pursuant to wiretap authorization that was unlawful due to either procedural or
substantive misuse).
101
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Fourth, Title III contains a minimization requirement.108 Under
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), even where the government intercepts
communications pursuant to a valid wiretap order, it must “minimize the
interception” of irrelevant communications.109 Courts view this provision
as requiring agents to take reasonable steps to avoid recording the
content of communications that are not relevant to their investigations.110
At the time of the ECPA’s passage, however, no such provision was
incorporated into the Pen/Trap Statute.111 This omission may have been
sensible given the fact that in 1986, neither courts nor Congress
anticipated that the collection of dialed digits by a pen register could
reveal more than the telephone number of the party to whom a call had
been directed, which, under Smith, was not protected information.112
By 1994, however, this view had changed markedly. That year,
Congress passed CALEA113 in response to new challenges faced by law
enforcement as a result of the “explosive growth” of wireless services
and technologies, such as call forwarding, that had started to impede the
government’s traditional wiretapping abilities.114 CALEA required the
telecommunications network providers to develop the capacity to selfmonitor their networks in order to expedite compliance with wiretap, pen
register, or other court orders for electronic information.115 While
expanding government access to electronic information, Congress also
struggled to protect the reasonable expectation of privacy the law
accorded to the content of electronic communications.116
Section 207 of CALEA enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). Entitled
“Limitation,” this section amended the Pen/Trap Statute by imposing a
minimization requirement on the use of pen registers.117 Under the
limitation, any agency authorized to install a pen register “shall use
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or
108

See id. § 2518(5).
Id.
110
See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
111
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
112
S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2006); see also supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
113
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
114
H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9, 12 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489,
3489, 3492; see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (summarizing
purposes of CALEA, including impediments posed to law enforcement by advanced technologies).
115
See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9-10, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3489-90.
116
Id. at 13 as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3493 (“[CALEA] seeks to balance three
key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and
personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new
communications services and technologies.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A) (2006)
(emphasizing the importance of monitoring telecommunications networks “in a manner that protects
. . . the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be
intercepted”).
117
Pub. L. No. § 207, 108 Stat. 4292 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)
(2006)).
109
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decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and
transmitting of wire or electronic communications.”118 This new language
reflected an emerging awareness of the fact that the digits a pen register
collected could include content.119
Divining the exact purpose behind the addition of the limitation,
however, is no simple task.120 Statements of purpose in the House
Report121 and statements by the bill’s sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy,122
indicate that Congress intended the limitation to protect the exercise of
the government’s surveillance authority and may have contemplated
allowing the government to collect PCTDDs that included content, so
long as it endeavored to minimize content by using reasonably available
technology.123 On the other hand, statements of purpose124 and statements

118

18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006).
During hearings in March, 1994, Senator Leahy and then FBI Director Louis Freeh
discussed the fact that some PCTDDs contained content:
119

Sen. LEAHY: You say this proposal would not expand law enforcement’s authority to
collect data on people, and yet if new technologies are used where we can dial up
everything from a video movie to doing our banking over the phone, you are going to
have access to a lot more data, just because the phone is being used.
Mr. FREEH: I do not want that access, and I am willing to concede that. What I want with
respect to pen registers is the dialing information: telephone numbers which are being
called, which I have now under pen register authority. As to the banking accounts and
what movies somebody is ordering at Blockbuster, I do not want it, do not need it, and I
am willing to have technological blocks with respect to that information, which I can get
with subpoenas or another process. I do not want that in terms of my access, and that is
not the transactional data that I need.
Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and
Services: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 50 (1994) (statements of Sen. Leahy and Louis J. Freeh, Director, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation) [hereinafter Freeh Statement].
120
See infra Part II.C.
121
H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 17, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3497 (“[T]he bill
. . . [e]xpressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices cannot be used
to obtain tracking or location information, other than that which can be determined from the phone
number . . . . Further, the bill requires law enforcement to use reasonably available technology to
minimize information obtained through pen registers.”) (emphasis added).
122
140 CONG. REC. S11,055, S11,055-56, S11,059 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1994) (“[The
limitation requires that a] government agency authorized to install and use a pen register under this
chapter or under State law, shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording
or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling information utilized in call
processing.”); In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
333 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citation omitted).
123
See E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting comments by Sen.
Leahy in support of both interpretations of the 1994 amendments).
124
See S. REP. No. 103-402, at 10 (1994) (“The bill further protects privacy by requiring
telecommunications systems to protect communications not authorized to be intercepted and by
restricting the ability of law enforcement to use pen register devices for tracking purposes or for
obtaining transactional information.”).
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by Senator Leahy125 in the Senate Report indicate that Congress intended
the limitation to restrict the government’s access to transactional
information, but are not amenable to an interpretation that views
minimization favorably.
As Congress prepared to pass the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
seven years later, Senator Leahy made several statements that appeared
to support the view that he believed that Congress intended the limitation
to prevent the collection of content.126 That year, Congress considered
two proposed amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute, each of which
prohibited the use of a pen register to collect content.127 To illuminate the
necessity of the proposed amendments, Senator Leahy explained that
although he had added the 1994 limitation after he “recognized that [pen
registers] collected content and that such collection was unconstitutional
on the mere relevance standard,”128 information obtained from the F.B.I.
in June 2000 indicated that the limitation had not deterred law
enforcement officials from collecting content with pen registers.129 The
limitation did not have the effect of prohibiting the collection of content
since, as the government argued, no technology was reasonably available
that would allow it to distinguish PCTDDs that contained content from
those that did not.130 Because it did not interpret the limitation’s
prohibition to be absolute, the government had continued to collect
content with pen registers in the same way that it had done for years.131
In this context, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, which,
pursuant to § 216, amended two sections of the Pen/Trap Statute.132 First,
§ 216(a) amended 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)—the 1994 limitation—to prohibit
the collection of content pursuant to the installation and use of a pen
register. As a result, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) read and continues to
read:
A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap and
trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use technology
reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic
125

See 140 CONG. REC. at S11,056 (statements of Sen. Leahy); 140 CONG. REC. S14,732,
S14,732 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statements of Sen. Leahy in support of Edwards-Leahy Digital
Telephony bill).
126
See 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statements of Sen.
Leahy). But see infra Part II.C.
127
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 288, 290 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3127(3)-(4) (2006)).
128
147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statements of Sen. Leahy).
129
Id. (“[T]he FBI advised me in June 2000, that pen register devices for telephone
services ‘continue to operate as they have for decades’ and that ‘there has been no change . . . that
would better restrict the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and
signaling information utilized in call processing.’” (quoting FBI’s explanation to Senator Leahy)).
130
See id. For a summary of this same history, see Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The
Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1198 (2004).
131
147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statements of Sen. Leahy).
132
See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288, 290 (2001) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3127(3)-(4)(2006)).
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or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic
communications.133

Section 216(c)(2) also modified 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), which
contains the statutory definition of a pen register.134 Specifically,
Congress defined a pen register, for the first time, as a device that cannot
collect content. The definition read and continues to read:
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process which records or decodes
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication . . . .135

From this history, it is evident that when the 2001 amendments
to the Pen/Trap Statute took effect, Congress was aware that PCTDDs
could contain content. Further, Congress recognized that the government
had interpreted the limitation that CALEA imposed in 1994 to authorize
the collection of all PCTDDs in the absence of reasonably available
technology to sort content from non-content. While amending the
Pen/Trap Statute to include new prohibitions on content collection,
Congress did not eliminate the “reasonably available technology” clause,
which formed the basis of the government’s claimed authority to collect
all PCTDDs. These observations are relevant to the analysis of the
Pen/Trap Statute that courts have performed, which is discussed in
Part II.
II.

INTERPRETING THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE

Until 2006, no court directly addressed the question of whether
the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes law enforcement agencies to collect
PCTDDs that contain content.136 Between 2006 and 2008, six courts137
issued written orders that justified their decisions to deny the portion of a
law enforcement agent’s ex parte application that sought to collect all
133

18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006) (emphasis added to reflect the 2001 amendment).
Id. § 3127(3).
135
Id. (emphasis added to reflect the 2001 amendment). The definition continues, “such
term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic
communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications
services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its
business.” Id. The PATRIOT Act also amended 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4), which defines trap and trace
devices, to provide that a trap and trace device shall not collect the content of a communication.
PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3).
136
During this time, two courts referenced the PCTDD question in dicta. See U.S.
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 277 F. 3d 450, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also In Re United States for an
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap on [xxx] Internet Service Account/User Name
[xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 2005).
137
See supra note 8.
134
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dialed digits from a telephone pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute.138 Given
the ex parte nature of each proceeding, the courts solicited amicus briefs
to represent the interests of the telephone user. The six decisions reached
inconsistent conclusions about whether the Pen/Trap Statute is
ambiguous, whether canons of statutory interpretation are relevant to the
question and, if so, how they apply, whether legislative history helps to
answer the question, and whether the Fourth Amendment protects
PCTDDs that contain content.
This Part approaches each question in turn. After identifying the
different ways that the statute can be interpreted, Part II.A concludes that
the plain language of the Pen/Trap Statute does not overwhelmingly lend
support to any particular textual interpretation. As a result of this
ambiguity, Part II.B applies traditional canons of statutory interpretation
to the different interpretations of the Pen/Trap Statute. Although the
canons lend support to the position that the Pen/Trap Statute does not
authorize the collection of content, they ultimately fail to be entirely
persuasive. Part II.C concludes that the legislative history of the
Pen/Trap Statute is also not dispositive on the question of whether the
statute authorizes the collection of minimal PCTDD content. However,
Part II.D concludes that because society is prepared to recognize a
reasonable expectation of privacy in PCTDDs that contain content, the
canon of constitutional avoidance counsels against an interpretation that
the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes the collection of content using a pen
register.
A.

The Plain Language of the Pen/Trap Statute

Following the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, the
opposing parties have argued that the plain language of the Pen/Trap
Statute mandates a particular conclusion about the legality of collecting
PCTDDs that contain content with a pen register.139 Consequently, three
primary interpretations of the text have arisen, each of which
fundamentally conflicts with the others. The role of the court in such
circumstances is to determine whether the statute’s plain language
supports one of the interpretations.140 This Part briefly summarizes the
138

That no court addressed this issue until five years after the passage of the PATRIOT
Act may be partially attributed to the fact that pen register applications are ex parte proceedings that
do not usually result in the publication of a written decision. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006). Further,
because the court is not entitled to receive facts concerning the investigation beyond the
investigator’s stipulation that the information sought to be collected is relevant, 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)
(2006), little has been documented about the number of pen register applications made and granted
each year, or about the reasons that a particular court granted or denied an application. See, e.g.,
Ditzion, supra note 12, and accompanying text; see also Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows:
The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 589-90 (2007).
139
See e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 174 (2001).
140
See e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
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three perspectives in order to illustrate that the Pen/Trap Statute is
ambiguous. Next, Part II.B critiques each perspective using traditional
canons of statutory interpretation.
1. The Government’s Theory
The government has argued that the Pen/Trap Statute’s text
authorizes the collection of PCTDDs that contain content.141 The
government’s briefs express this theory in two assertions. First, the
limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) requires that if technology that can
distinguish between content and non-content is reasonably available,
then the government must use that technology to avoid collecting
content.142 However, if technology that can screen content from noncontent is not reasonably available, then the limitation permits the pen
register to access content incident to its collection of non-content.143
Accordingly, the government views the limitation as an exception144 to
the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) that provides that a pen register shall
not collect the content of any communication.145
2. The “Added Precaution” Theory
A contrary perspective adopted by some courts is that the
limitation does not operate as an exception to the general prohibition on
collecting content, but rather precludes the collection of all PCTDDs
where the collection of content cannot be prevented.146 This theory can
also be reduced to two assertions. First, if technology that is reasonably
available to minimize the collection of content exists, then the
141

The government articulated this interpretation in 2002, shortly after the PATRIOT Act
went into effect. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to Ass’t U.S.
Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., et al., Avoiding Collection and Investigative Use of “Content” in the
Operation of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 3-4 (May 24, 2002) [hereinafter Thompson
Memo]. This interpretation continues to represent the government’s position on the issue. See, e.g.,
Government’s Supp. Memo. of Law Demonstrating that Incidental Access to Post-cut-through
Dialed Digit Content Under the Pen/Trap Statute Is Constitutional at 1-2, In re United States for
Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Misc. 547, 06
Misc. 561, 07 Misc. 120), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 541 at *1-*2 [hereinafter Gov’t Brief,
June ’07].
142
Thompson Memo, supra note 141, at 4 (articulating the DOJ’s position that the
inadvertent collection of PCTDDs that contain content should be avoided but, where it occurs, the
agent should not use the content affirmatively); see also Gov’t Brief, June ‘07, supra note 141, at
*1-*2.
143
Gov’t Brief, June ‘07, supra note 141, at *11.
144
Id. (“The [limitation] establishes ground rules governing circumstances in which it is
difficult for the government to know in advance” whether pen register information represents
content or non-content.).
145
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
146
In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Consumer Records, and (3) Cell
Phone Tracking (S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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government must use it.147 However, if no technology that is reasonably
available can separate content from non-content, then the government
may not collect PCTDDs.148 Under this theory, the limitation is only
operative when technology that can screen content from non-content is
reasonably available, in which instance the government must use it.
Where such technology is not reasonably available, the limitation does
not otherwise condone the use of a pen register to collect content.149
Thus, the limitation functions primarily as an “added precaution” to
prevent content collection.150
3. The “Preclusive Definition” Theory
A third perspective adopted by one court is similar to the second.
Its proponents emphasize that under the definition of a pen register in 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3), it is unlawful for a pen register to record the content of
a communication.151 If a device records PCTDDs that contain content,
then that device is not a pen register.152 Under this theory, the limitation
provision is not a factor in the analysis of whether in certain
circumstances a pen register can collect PCTDDs that contain content,
because as soon as a device collects content, the device is not a pen
register, and the Pen/Trap Statute is no longer implicated.153
4. Statutory Ambiguity
The next subsection demonstrates problems with each of these
interpretations.154 At this point, it is only necessary to observe that each
perspective is based on and equally supported by the plain language of
the Pen/Trap Statute. This illuminates the fundamental flaw of the
statute: it provides no guidance about the effect of an absence of
reasonably available technology to effectively filter content from noncontent. A more sensible approach is to view the first three theories
147

Id. at 825.
Id. at 825-26.
149
Id.; see also United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of an
Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 at 5 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (“In the Court’s view, § 3121(c) operates
as an additional privacy safeguard, rather than an enabling provision.”).
150
In re United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trade Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.
(S.D. Tex. II), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77635 at *31-32 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (“The requirement
to use ‘reasonably available technology’ is a supplement to the Government’s obligation not to
collect contents with a pen register.”).
151
In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and
Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced
By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364 at *8-*9 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 15, 2008).
152
Id. at *8-*9, *11.
153
See id. (denying government’s pen register application with no discussion of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3121(c)).
154
See infra Part II.B.
148
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critically and conclude, as one court has done, that the Pen/Trap Statute
is ambiguous.155 The language of the statute contradicts itself because the
definition of a pen register includes an unconditional prohibition of the
use of a pen register to collect content,156 yet the limitation provision
appears to require only the use of reasonably available technology to
prevent the collection of content.157
B.

Applying Canons of Statutory Interpretation to the Pen/Trap
Statute

Canons of statutory interpretation are “rules of thumb” that
courts apply to aid in statutory interpretation.158 Courts are not bound by
the result that the application of a particular canon would produce.159
Further, the individual canons have been criticized for being easily
countered.160 Nevertheless, courts continue to apply them routinely.
Because the ambiguity inherent in the Pen/Trap Statute gives rise to
several possible interpretations of its text, this Part will assess the effect
of several applicable canons of construction on the three emergent
interpretations.
The government’s interpretative theory161 is undesirable because
it interprets statutory silence as modifying the plain commandment of 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3) that a pen register shall not collect content.162 To
subscribe to the government’s view is to conclude that the limitation,
which is only operative after the government has received authorization
to use a pen register, alters the scope of what a pen register can do.163
Yet, the only way to reach the conclusion that the limitation alters the
definition of a pen register is to rely on Congressional silence, which is
generally undesirable.164 The statute fails to provide that the lack of
reasonably available technology to sort content from non-content has any
effect on the abilities of a pen register. This silence should not be
interpreted as an implied exception to the clear commandment of 18

155

In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
332 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
159
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 849 (4th Ed. 2007).
160
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
161
See supra notes 141-145.
162
This canon of interpretation may be referred to as the “dog that did not bark.” Chisom
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ.,
127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541-45 (2007).
163
S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
164
See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396.
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U.S.C. § 3127(3), since it can be presumed that if Congress intended
such an exception, it could easily have provided it explicitly.165
A second canon of interpretation advises courts to interpret an
ambiguous statutory provision in a way that is consistent with the whole
act of which it is a part.166 Under this canon, viewing the limitation as a
prohibition of the collection of content where sorting technology is not
reasonably available—the added precaution theory that some courts have
adopted—is preferable to the government’s theory. Such an
interpretation has the advantage of maintaining consistency within the
Pen/Trap Statute, since it does not require inferring from statutory
silence exceptions to the plain commandment in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).167
In this way, the interpretation minimizes the conflict between the
limitation and the definition.
On the other hand, the precaution theory can be criticized on the
grounds that adopting it renders the limitation mere surplusage. A
separate canon of construction guides courts to avoid such a result,
counseling against interpretations of statutory provisions that strip
particular words of meaning.168 To conclude, as the precaution theory
does, that the limitation operates to “supplement”169 the definition of a
pen register is to say that the limitation merely reiterates, or repeats, what
is written elsewhere. Yet such repetition is redundant. If a pen register by
definition cannot collect content, then the limitation is unnecessary to the
extent that it merely functions to remind courts that a pen register cannot
collect content.
Formal logic is a useful way of illustrating the application of the
canons of interpretation to the government’s theory and the precaution
theory.170 As noted above, each perspective imposes a “gloss”171 onto the
interplay between the two statutory provisions. Although the statute is
not phrased in the form of an if-then conditional, both perspectives
proceed from the assumption that it can be understood as such.172 For
instance, both theories concur that under the statute, if technology to sort
content from non-content is reasonably available, then the government
must use it to prevent the collection of content (if X, then Y).173 Yet the
165

See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259-60 (1994).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 273-74 (2006).
167
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
168
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113-14 (2001); see e.g., TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).
169
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
170
This method of analysis comes from an amicus brief submitted by the Federal
Defenders of New York. Supplemental Memorandum of Law by Amici Curiae for Fed. Defenders of
N.Y., Inc. & Elec. Frontier Found. at 33-34, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers and
Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d
325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-Misc.-547, 561), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 540, at *33-*34
[hereinafter Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07].
171
See S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
172
See supra notes 142-143, 147-148 and accompanying text.
173
Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *33-*34.
166
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two perspectives diverge with respect to the consequences that arise if no
technology is reasonably available to perform the sorting (not X). The
government’s theory concludes that if no technology exists, the
government can collect content (if not X, then not Y). The precaution
theory concludes that if no technology exists, the government cannot
collect content (if not X, then Y). Yet both perspectives suffer from a
logical fallacy.
By concluding that if not X, then not Y, the government’s
perspective commits the common logical error of denying the
antecedent.174 In an if-then conditional such as “if X then Y,” the
negation of X has no bearing on whether or not Y obtains.175 It follows
that in the Pen/Trap Statute, even if it is correct to reduce the statute to a
conditional form, the absence of reasonably available technology (not X)
does not require any particular result as to whether or not a pen register
can collect content (maybe Y, but maybe not).
Similarly, under the precaution approach (if not X, then Y), X is
stripped of any utility because Y remains constant whether or not the
condition X is satisfied. Proponents of this theory argue that if
technology is reasonably available (if X), then no content may be
collected (then Y). But the same proponents also argue that if technology
is not reasonably available (if not X), then no content may be collected
(then Y).176 Because content may not be collected whether or not
technology is reasonably available, it appears that there is no relationship
between X and Y. This, in turn, reiterates the conclusion that under the
precaution theory, the limitation is superfluous.
The definitional theory conflicts even more clearly with the
canon against superfluities.177 As noted above, under the definitional
theory, the limitation does not factor into the analysis of a pen register’s
ability to collect content.178 As soon as a device collects data that includes
content, the device is not a pen register. If the device is not a pen register,
the limitation does not apply. There are no other circumstances in which
the limitation would apply, because the limitation only applies to pen
registers that collect data that might include content. Thus, this theory
essentially writes the limitation out of the statute.
In sum, applying the canons of interpretation fails to cure the
ambiguity of the Pen/Trap Statute because each of the three theories
appears equally prone to criticism. Although one additional canon is
174

ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS:
SYMBOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (1997) (“One who gives this argument a superficial
examination may hold that it exhibits the form modus tollens. Closer inspection, however, will show
that it is the counterfeit of modus tollens, the invalid pattern called the fallacy of denying the
antecedent.”); see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *33-*34.
175
RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 174, at 51.
176
See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
177
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
178
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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discussed below in Part II.D, before proceeding to that discussion, Part
II.C briefly examines the legislative history of the statute for additional
signs of legislative intent.
C.

The Legislative History of the Pen/Trap Statute

When confronted with an ambiguous statute, courts often resort
to legislative history in order to ascertain the effect that Congress
intended the statute to have.179 The process of using legislative history
has its critics.180 Nevertheless, courts routinely resort to legislative
history, despite academic critiques of its utility. Among proponents of
legislative history, committee reports are generally viewed as the most
persuasive form of legislative history.181 Statements made by individual
senators are less persuasive than committee reports,182 however,
statements made by a bill’s sponsor are typically considered more
persuasive than the remarks of other Congressmen.183
As noted previously, the legislative history of CALEA
concerning the passage of the 1994 amendment that enacted the
limitation is ambiguous.184 Statements in the Senate and House Reports
and statements made directly by Senator Leahy185 alternate between
indicating that the limitation envisioned minimal collection of content,
and indicating that it did not.186 No clear answer to the question of
whether Congress intended a pen register to collect PCTDDs that contain
a minimal amount of content emerges by resorting to legislative history
from 1994.
The legislative history related to the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act in 2001 is equally unhelpful. Unlike the 1994
amendments, no committee reports address the intended effect of the
amendments of § 216.187 However, Senator Leahy made remarks bearing
directly on the intended effect of § 216 on the Pen/Trap Statute.188
179

See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-57 (1984); see also In re Sinclair,
870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989).
180
See SCALIA, supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
181
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 981; see, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 91-96 (1989); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585-86 (1957).
182
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 1020.
183
Id. at 1000 (suggesting that the “statements by sponsors are given such deference in
part because the sponsors are the most knowledgeable legislators about the proposed bill and in part
because their representations about the purposes and effects of the proposal are relied upon by other
legislators”).
184
See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
185
Senate Report 103-402 accompanied the Digital Telephony Bill of 1994. S. REP. No.
103-402, at 10 (1994). No senate report was submitted with CALEA. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 1
(1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489.
186
See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
187
Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Requests for Authorization to
Acquire Post-cut-through Dialed Digits Via Pen Registers at 26-27, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use
of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber

2009]

THE COLLECTION OF PCTDD’S WITH A PEN REGISTER

1133

This legislative history can be viewed in two distinct ways. Both
ways agree on certain fundamental points. First, it is evident that in 1994,
members of Congress recognized that pen registers could collect
content,189 and that in 2001, members of Congress recognized that pen
registers routinely did collect content.190 Second, it is evident that in
2001, members of Congress recognized that the government based its
authority to collect PCTDDs that contained content on its interpretation
of the 1994 limitation embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c).191 Third, it is
evident that with these first two factors in mind, Congress enacted
legislation that amended three provisions of the Pen/Trap Statute,
including the limitation itself, with language that prohibited the use of a
pen register to collect content.192
With this in mind, it is possible to view the Pen/Trap Statute
from an “aerial” perspective. The evolution of the statute over time—
from its inception in 1986 to the 1994 and 2001 amendments—is
consistent with a desire by Congress to protect the content of electronic
communications despite the advent of new technologies that threatened
that status.193 When Congress realized in 1994 that pen registers could
collect content, it enacted the limitation. When Congress realized that the
limitation did not prevent the collection of content in practice, it enacted
three additional provisions intended to prohibit the collection of
content.194 From this history, it is possible to conclude as a general matter
that the three amendments point towards a singular conclusion, namely
that, “interception of any communications content is not authorized, and
technology must be used to insure that communications content is not
collected.”195 If viewed in this way, the legislative history supports the
denial of an application to install and use a pen register to collect all
digits dialed from a subject telephone.196
On the other hand, by placing more emphasis on the specific
circumstances surrounding the 2001 amendments, arguments to the
contrary emerge. It is apparent that in 2001, Senator Leahy believed that
the collection of content by a pen register was unconstitutional.197
However, that Senator Leahy held this belief does not mean that each
Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Misc. 547, No. 6 Misc. 561), 2007 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 545, at *26-*27 [hereinafter Gov’t Brief, Jan. ‘07].
188
147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S10,999 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
189
See e.g., Freeh Statement, supra note 119, and accompanying text.
190
147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
191
Id.
192
See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
193
S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 827.
196
See In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap
and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d
325, 333-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
197
147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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member of Congress shared it. In fact, Senator Leahy’s remarks indicate
that during the process of reaching consensus on the provisions of the
bill, he encountered and acquiesced to resistance to his efforts to add
additional protection for PCTDDs that contain content. Examining the
compromises made between parties with distinctly different viewpoints
about a divisive issue is an important way of gauging the effect that
Congress intended the statute to have.
For instance, Senator Leahy proposed that the PATRIOT Act
should include specific definitions for the terms “routing” and
“addressing” to ensure that courts did not interpret the terms so broadly
that they included content.198 Yet, the Bush Administration and the
Department of Justice “flatly rejected” that approach.199 Senator Leahy
worried that the Administration’s desire to leave the terms undefined
would fail to protect content.200 But Congress did not decide to include
definitions in the statute. Instead, Congress and the Administration
reached a compromise that included amending the definitions of a pen
register and trap-and-trace device and the limitation to prohibit the
collection of content. Thus, although Senator Leahy personally believed
that content collection under the statute should be prohibited, his
statements indicate that the statute did not follow a path that would have
unequivocally achieved this effect. It follows that because the
amendments represented a compromise between Senator Leahy and the
Administration, they should not be viewed as adopting only Senator
Leahy’s view and absolutely prohibiting the collection of content.201
Driven by his concerns about content collection, Senator Leahy
also sought to update and modify the judicial review procedure for
obtaining authorization to install and use a pen register by requiring law
enforcement agents to present details of their investigations to the judges
who consider their applications. Senator Leahy did not argue that the
relevance standard should be enhanced, but only that courts should learn
more information about the underlying investigations.202 Again, Senator
Leahy met with defeat. The Bush administration refused to capitulate,
and Senator Leahy acquiesced, but nevertheless appeared satisfied with
the final result.203 This progression carries two implications. First, it
198

Id.
Id.
200
Id.
201
For a discussion that highlights the importance of identifying legislative compromises,
see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 67 (“[T]he existence of vetogates may tell statutory
interpreters . . . to whom they should pay attention if they consult legislative history . . . . Legislative
statements are most important when they reflect assurances by the enacting coalition—especially
promises to or by gatekeepers—to enable the bill to pass through a vetogate.”).
202
147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
203
Id.; see also id. at S11,015 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“It is not precisely the bill I
would have written . . . . But it is a good bill. It is a balanced bill. . . . It is one that sets up the checks
and balances necessary in a democratic society that allow us to protect and preserve our security but
also protect and preserve our liberties.”).
199
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appears that if the statute required more disclosure, then Senator Leahy
would have been comfortable if courts continued to grant pen register
applications on the low relevance standard, despite the fact that pen
registers were known to collect content. Second, the legislation that
finally passed did not reflect only Senator Leahy’s vision of how the
statute would operate, but also took into account the perspective of the
Bush Administration, which viewed the collection of PCTDDs that
contain content favorably.
Lastly, Senator Leahy also acknowledged that the FBI had
reported that it continued to collect content because there had been no
change in technology that would “better restrict” the information
collected so as to include only non-content.204 The FBI’s use of the
phrase “better restrict” indicates that it sought to develop technology that
would screen content more efficiently, but not completely. Yet despite
being made aware of the FBI’s perspective, neither Senator Leahy nor
Congress categorically rejected the possibility that a pen register could
collect minimal content if technology could “better restrict” that process.
Nor did Senator Leahy express any intention to modify or eliminate the
limitation, which was known to be the basis of the government’s claimed
authority to collect PCTDDs that contain content.205
In sum, the legislative history of the Pen/Trap Statute is
amenable to two interpretations. On the macro level, the evolution of the
Pen/Trap Statute, culminating in the passage of three distinct
amendments that prohibited the collection of content, supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to prevent the collection of content by
a pen register. On the micro level, the legislative history demonstrates
that the amendments that emerged from the legislative process resulted
from compromises between those who advocated greater protection for
content and those who rejected greater protection for content. Thus,
Congress did not intend the amendments to protect content completely.
Because this history lends equal support to both outcomes, it cannot be
dispositive on the question of whether the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes
the collection of content with a pen register.206
D.

Applying the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance to the Pen/Trap
Statute

A stronger argument in support of the conclusion that the
Pen/Trap Statute does not authorize the collection of content lies in

204

Id. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
Gov’t Brief, Jan. ‘07, supra note 187, at *31-*32.
206
See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994) (refusing to view
legislative history as dispositive of Congressional intent in the absence of evidence that members of
Congress believed that they had reached a tacit agreement to a controversial issue).
205
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applying the canon of constitutional avoidance.207 This canon has been
described as “the preeminent canon of federal statutory construction.”208
It guides courts choosing between competing interpretations of a
statutory text to choose an interpretation that avoids raising a
constitutional question.209 To apply the canon, a court need not determine
that a particular statutory interpretation would undoubtedly conflict with
the Constitution. Rather, a court must only conclude that the
interpretation might be unconstitutional, and then avoid it.210
Congress has historically gone to great lengths to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment protects the content of electronic communications.211
Further, the Supreme Court has given no indication that the content of
electronic communications is entitled to less protection when it is
conveyed over a telephone in the form of PCTDDs than when it is
conveyed through other means that require compliance with Title III’s
procedures. Nevertheless, the government has argued that a telephone
user cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy after entering
such digits into an automated telephone system.212 The government
reaches this result by extending the holding in Smith. Under its view, a
caller assumes the same risk with respect to PCTDDs as with respect to
the digits dialed to connect a telephone call because both types of digits
must be conveyed to the telephone company, which can in turn record all
of the digits dialed.213 It follows from this interpretation that no dialed
digits are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.214
Yet at its outset, Smith acknowledged that its holding did not
address the government’s ability to capture the content of
communications.215 Rather, Smith presupposed a context in which a pen
register intercepted non-content digits voluntarily transmitted to a
telephone company in order to complete a call, but could not intercept
content.216 The PCTDD issue today has arisen squarely outside Smith’s
framework. It exists within a fundamentally different context and

207

In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
335 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
208
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1945, 1948 (1997).
209
See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-82 (2005); see also Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002).
210
Vermeule, supra note 208, at 1958.
211
E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36; see also Kerr, supra note 69, at 630-31.
212
Brief for Gov’t, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers, 515 F. Supp. 2d
325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-Misc.-547, 561, 07-Misc.-120), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 539,
at *2.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (“[P]en registers do not acquire the
contents of communications.”).
216
Id. at 741-42.
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presents constitutional concerns that Smith did not foresee.217
Consequently, it is doubtful whether Smith’s holding governs the
interception of content with a pen register at all. It is even more doubtful
whether extending Smith in order to justify the collection of content
under the Pen/Trap Statute would be constitutional, for the simple fact
that Congress has repeatedly recognized that the Fourth Amendment
protects the content of electronic communications.218 For these reasons,
the government’s interpretation should be avoided under the canon of
constitutional avoidance.
Even a court that applied Smith to PCTDDs would reach the
same result. Smith applied the test articulated in Katz, which determines
whether a particular form of electronic surveillance violates the Fourth
Amendment.219 Under Katz, the person invoking Fourth Amendment
protection must demonstrate a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate
expectation of privacy in the information sought to be protected.220 This
inquiry is normally satisfied by demonstrating both that an individual
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and also that the individual’s
subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.221
In light of Katz, the government’s argument is unavailing
because it fails to consider the actual nature of PCTDDs. Both Katz and
Congress have emphasized that the content of a communication is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.222 Despite the expectations of
privacy that people maintain in their bank account numbers, social
security numbers, or other private information,223 the government’s
theory associates PCTDDs most closely with digits dialed to connect a
call. Yet, when they contain substantive, private information, PCTDDs
actually resemble the content that Katz sought to protect.224 When a
telephone user enters PCTDDs to navigate an automated answering
system, the PCTDDs are the equivalent of a conversation with an entity
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See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of

Sen. Leahy).
218

18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006); see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170,

at *27-*28.
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See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
221
Id. But see id. at 740 n.5 (noting that “where an individual’s subjective expectations
had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those
subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was”).
222
See supra notes 38, 50-51 and accompanying text.
223
In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325,
336 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
224
Id.
220
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representative that would otherwise be protected.225 Without a wiretap
order, a pen register cannot lawfully intercept the oral component of
telephone conversations. Similarly, a pen register should not be able to
intercept lawfully the functional equivalent of an actual conversation
simply because it takes the form of a PCTDD.226 To conclude otherwise
would interfere with telephone users’ legitimate expectation of privacy in
PCTDDs that contain content.
Finally, in Smith, the Court rejected the petitioner’s privacy
claim because it imputed to telephone users, as a class, notice that dialed
digits may be monitored, which bolstered its conclusion that one who
dials a telephone assumes a known risk that those digits might be
provided to the government.227 Yet while the third-party disclosure
principle supplies grounds for eliminating Fourth Amendment
protection,228 its application in Smith rests on the assumption that a
reasonable user will know that he is revealing information in a manner
that can lead to its interception.229 It is a stretch to say that the telephone
user assumes the risk that digits dialed into an automated system after
being connected to the target number will be monitored by the telephone
company,230 because the telephone user receives inadequate notice that
such a risk exists.231 For instance, PCTDDs are not listed on monthly bills
like digits dialed to connect a call.232 Nor would a telephone user have
225

Michael A. Rosow, Note, Is “Big Brother” Listening? A Critical Analysis of New
Rules Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies to Use Dialed Digit Extraction, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1051, 1073 (2000).
226
Id. at 1078. PCTDDs can also be analogized to the digits transmitted to pagers.
E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339. Courts considering the question have held that the Fourth
Amendment protects digits transmitted to pagers. See, e.g., Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 294 (4th
Cir. 1995).
227
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
228
See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text.
229
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business.”).
230
It is beyond the scope of this Note to evaluate a debate between the Federal Defenders
of New York and the Government about whether the particular way in which PCTDDs are
transmitted should factor into the determination of whether the Fourth Amendment protects them.
Compare Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *5-*6 (distinguishing between the
transmission of digits over the control channel and content channels), with Gov’t Brief, June ‘07,
supra note 141, at *9-*10 (minimizing the distinction between the control and content channels). For
technical information about digital telephony technology, see Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act: Hearing Before the FCC (1999) (statement of Dave Yarbaugh, FBI Supervisory
Special Agent), available at http://www.askcalea.net/lef/docs/990127-y.pdf; see also
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: Hearing Before the FCC (1999) (statement of
John W. Cutright, FBI Electrical Engineer), available at http://www.askcalea.com/lef/docs/990127c.pdf..
231
Further, such a risk is not consonant with the expectations of privacy that the
telephone user would retain if the same information was transmitted by conversation. On the other
hand, that the Fourth Amendment would not protect digits dialed to connect a telephone call is
consonant with the fact that automated dialing systems are the functional equivalent of live
operators, to whom the user willingly revealed the destination telephone number. Smith, 442 U.S. at
744-45.
232
Rosow, supra note 225, at 1078.
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any reason to expect a continued need for monitoring by the telephone
company beyond the point of connection to a third party’s line.233
In Smith, the Court identified multiple ways in which the
telephone user received notification of the telephone company’s capacity
to monitor digits dialed to connect calls.234 Because it was reasonable to
conclude that the telephone user received notice that such practices could
occur, the Court concluded it was unreasonable to believe that a
telephone user expected communications to be private.235 Yet the Court
did not and has never held that a telephone user assumes the risk that
communications may be revealed solely because the telephone company
possesses the capacity or occasionally chooses to monitor electronic
transmissions. Notice to the user—at least sufficient to impute
knowledge—is also a necessary element of the assumption of risk
argument. To conclude otherwise would achieve the result that Smith
rejected by conditioning Fourth Amendment protection on the particular
industry practices of the service provider, without regard for a reasonable
user’s actual or imputed knowledge of those practices.236 By this logic,
even the content of actual conversations could be revealed by a pen
register, since the telephone company has the capacity to monitor
conversations.237
In sum, telephone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in PCTDDs that contain content. Society generally and Congress in
particular have traditionally regarded the content of electronic
communications as private. Further, telephone users do not voluntarily
assume the risk that content transmitted via telephone in the form of a
PCTDD will be revealed to the government. In light of this, the Fourth
Amendment protects PCTDDs that contain content. Therefore, under the
canon of avoidance, the Pen/Trap Statute should not be interpreted to
permit the collection of content, since such an interpretation would bring
the statute into conflict with the United States Constitution.
III.

AMENDING THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE

Interpreting the Pen/Trap Statute to permit the collection of
content will create constitutional problems and may violate the Fourth
233

Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43 (identifying commonly known reasons that a telephone
company monitors dialed digits, including “to aid in the identification of persons making annoying
or obscene calls”).
234
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
235
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43.
236
Id. at 745.
237
Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (A “telephone conversation itself must be
electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by
the use of other company equipment.”). Title III provides an exception for such practices. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006); see also In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I),
515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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Amendment.238 Although a preferable approach is to interpret the
Pen/Trap Statute to prohibit the collection of content, to some extent this
may limit the utility to law enforcement agencies of a valuable
investigative tool.239 Both options have drawbacks. Therefore, the
Pen/Trap Statute requires immediate attention from Congress.
This Part identifies possible methods for amending the Pen/Trap
Statute that balance the need to adequately protect privacy expectations
with law enforcement’s ability to use pen registers in the course of
conducting investigations. In Part A, this Note suggests several courses
of action intended to redress the statutory ambiguity created by the 1994
limitation. In Part B, this Note reiterates suggestions made by other
commentators that apply to the Pen/Trap Statute more generally.
A.

Amending the 1994 Limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)
1. Articulate the Consequences of a Lack of Reasonably
Available Technology

The interpretive tension in the Pen/Trap Statute results from the
interplay between the statutory definition of a pen register in 18 U.S.C. §
3127(3) and the 1994 limitation reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c).240 The
definition provides that pen registers shall not collect content. The
limitation contains a positive commandment to use reasonably available
technology to sort content from non-content, but fails to articulate the
consequence of an absence of such technology. This failure allows the
statute to be interpreted to permit the collection of content.
If the limitation remains in the statute, then amending the
limitation to include language that articulated the effect of an absence of
reasonably available technology to sort content from non-content would
effectively resolve the ambiguity of the statute. It would also end the
divisive speculation into the effect of the limitation and the fruitless
debate about Congress’s intention in passing the various amendments to
the Pen/Trap Statute over the past several decades.
Congress must articulate the effect of an absence of reasonably
available sorting technology. To align the limitation with the
considerations discussed in this Note, any additional statutory language
should continue to reflect the policies of the PATRIOT Act and prohibit
the collection of content. One option would be to provide that in the
absence of reasonably available technology, the pen register shall be
restricted to collecting the first ten digits of any numbers dialed. This

238

See supra Part II.D.
See E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339; see also S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825
(S.D. Tex. 2006).
240
See generally Part II.B.
239
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would effectively prevent pen registers from collecting PCTDDs.241 The
government currently possesses technology that enables it to record a
specified number of dialed digits.242 Should the government utilize that
technology to record ten digits, it could use those ten digits to identify
calls that a telephone user placed to calling card companies. The
government could in turn subpoena the calling card provider directly in
order to determine the final destination to which the call was routed,
rather than the telephone service provider, in order to collect non-content
PCTDDs,243 to which it would be entitled under the Pen/Trap Statute.
This solution would impose a greater administrative burden on
the government. However, this burden would provide a positive
incentive to develop technology to sort PCTDDs. The current statutory
regime disincentives such research and development because the
government faces no adverse consequences as a result of continuing to
collect PCTDDs that contain content. In fact, the government may even
have a perverse incentive to avoid developing technology to sort
PCTDDs containing content from those that do not, in order to continue
obtaining all PCTDDs for as long as possible.244
2. Modify or Eliminate the Reasonably Available Technology
Provision
A second alternative is to modify the limitation by deleting the
technology reasonably available exception. One significant benefit of
this option is that it would minimize the risk of future constitutional
violations by creating an unequivocal prohibition on the collection of
content. For instance, the government’s interpretation of the Pen/Trap
Statute would be diffused if Congress struck language from the current
version of 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) in the following manner:
(c) Limitation.—A government agency authorized to install and use a pen
register or trap and trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of
electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic
communications.245

241

To date, one law enforcement agency adopted this strategy, agreeing to configure its
computers to automatically delete all PCTDDs received from the telephone service provider. This
mooted the legal question of whether the pen register could collect all PCTDDs. United States for an
Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices (E.D.N.Y. II), No. 08308, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97359, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2008).
242
S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
243
Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *13.
244
147 CONG. REC. 10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1001) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *36 n.13.
245
18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006) (alterations to original). The alterations appearing in the
block quote are intended to serve an illustrative purpose.
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The drawback to this suggestion is that the limitation would be
superfluous. Since the definition of a pen register excludes any device
that is capable of collecting content, it goes without saying that the
government should use technology that prevents it from collecting
content when acting under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute. If the
limitation merely reiterated this conclusion, it may as well not be
included in the statute.
Therefore, another possibility that would confer the same benefit
is to eliminate the limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(c) altogether. The
limitation is unnecessary if the definition of a pen register contains a
plain prohibition on the collection of content. Further, if no reasonably
available technology can sort content from non-content, then the
limitation does nothing but muddle the statutory text. The limitation only
applies to a set of circumstances that do not exist. Meanwhile, the
limitation creates ambiguity by failing to address the circumstances at
hand. It appears that the primary function of the limitation is to create
confusion.
With the limitation removed from the statutory text, the statutory
definition of a pen register would plainly prohibit the collection of
content. While this result would temporarily decrease the utility of a pen
register for law enforcement agencies, it would not prevent them from
obtaining content-based PCTDDs pursuant to other valid methods. For
instance, with a showing of probable cause, the government would still
be able to obtain a wiretap warrant to intercept PCTDDs.246 In addition,
the method of restricting the collection of digits dialed to ten would also
be available. Further, as soon as the government developed technology to
sort content from non-content, it would employ that technology to avoid
collecting content, even without the limitation. In other words, the
limitation is not an essential component of the Pen/Trap Statute and
could be eliminated with no significant negative repercussions.
B.

Broad Amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute
1. Allow Judicial Review

Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) provides that the court “shall”
authorize a pen register upon certification by a government
representative of its relevancy to an investigation.247 For so long as pen
registers can collect content, Congress should amend this section in order
to allow for judicial review during the consideration of a pen register
246

S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 818; see also United States for an Order Authorizing
the Installation and Use of an Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 at 6 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (“[T]he
government is not without a remedy: if it decides that obtaining post-cut-through digits is
sufficiently important to its criminal investigation, it may submit a wiretap application.”).
247
18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(b), 3123(a) (2006).
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application. Senator Leahy has advocated that the standard for judicial
review should be heightened to provide courts a degree of independent
latitude.248 Instead of relying on a law enforcement agent’s certification
that the digits sought to be collected are relevant to an investigation, the
court could review the facts for itself to determine whether that was
indeed the case. This solution will not minimize the likelihood that the
use of a pen register will create a constitutional conflict, since pen
registers will still be capable of collecting content. However, granting
courts the power of judicial review will at least add oversight to the
application process and may prevent the collection of content where the
justification for such collection is weak.
2. Heighten the Standard of Proof
Alternatively, the House Judiciary Committee has proposed that
Congress modify the Pen/Trap Statute to provide that before a pen
register can be ordered and installed, the government must demonstrate
“specific and articulable facts [that] reasonably indicate that a crime has
been, is being, or will be committed, and [that] information likely to be
obtained by such installation and use . . . is relevant to an investigation of
that crime.”249 Another option suggested by one commentator is to raise
the relevancy standard so that pen registers can only be authorized
pursuant to a greater showing of suspicion, such as the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard that applies to requests for disclosure of
cable records under the Cable Communications Policy Act.250 It is clear
that either of these options, if adopted, would improve the status quo.
3. Provide a Suppression Remedy
If Congress does not eliminate the limitation, it should amend
the Pen/Trap Statute with a provision that provides for the suppression of
any PCTDDs collected or decoded by a pen register that represent
content.251 Currently, the government is under no mandate to discard
content collected with a pen register and courts routinely admit evidence
collected by pen registers, even if that evidence was collected in an
unlawful manner.252 Although the government’s official position is not to
248

147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
Id. (citing Report 106-932, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. 13, Oct. 4, 2000). The Bush
Administration rejected adding this proposed language to the statute. Id. Another commentator has
suggested amending the standard of proof in the context of Internet surveillance using a pen register.
See Ditzion, supra note 12, at 1351 (“[A] higher standard for approving Internet pen register orders
should be established.”).
250
Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1375, 1437 (2004).
251
See Ditzion, supra note 12, at 1348-49 (suggesting ways to clarify and improve pen
register laws); see also Bankston, supra note 138, at 631.
252
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
249
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make affirmative use of content, agents of the DOJ have also received
instructions to store records of all content collected indefinitely.253 By
amending the Pen/Trap Statute to mandate the suppression of content
collected with a pen register, Congress would ensure that content
collected under a mere relevance standard cannot be used against a
telephone user. This would minimize the risk of harm flowing from the
constitutional violation of collecting content with a pen register. It would
also harmonize the Pen/Trap Statute with Title III, which provides for the
suppression of the content of oral or wire communications intercepted
unlawfully.254
4. Increased Transparency About the Installation and Use of
Pen Registers
Any discussion of pen registers is limited by a lack of
information.255 There is no meaningful account of the number of
applications to install and use a pen register made each year. Likewise,
there is no accessible record of the number of applications to install and
use a pen register granted or denied by courts.256 Although anecdotal
evidence indicates that law enforcement agencies install and operate
thousands of pen registers each year,257 it is impossible to fully appreciate
the significance of the government’s ability to collect content under the
Pen/Trap Statute without knowing how often this practice occurs. To
cure this lack of transparency, the Pen/Trap Statute should be updated to
require an annual report about the government’s use of pen registers.258
As with the proposed suppression remedy, Title III provides a
fitting model for updating the reporting requirements of the Pen/Trap
Statute.259 Congress should require the appropriate officials to report
annually to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
comprehensive details about pen register applications,260 including the
percentage of pen register orders that authorize the collection of all digits
dialed from a particular telephone number, as distinguished from those
orders that restrict the collection of PCTDDs to dialing information.261
253

Thompson Memo, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006).
255
Bankston, supra note 138, at 634 (emphasizing that “only the DOJ” knows the extent
of electronic surveillance carried out under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute).
256
Id. On the other hand, information about the total number of wiretap applications
approved each year is readily accessible. See http://www.uscourts.gov/library/wiretap.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009).
257
See supra notes 13-14.
258
Bankston, supra note 138, at 633 (suggesting the same solution).
259
18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2006).
260
Id. § 2519(2) (2006).
261
Records reflecting this distinction would show whether a judicial consensus to restrict
the collection of PCTDDs was emerging over time. See, e.g., United States for an Order Authorizing
the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices (E.D.N.Y. II), No. 08-308, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97359, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2008).
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Further, that office should forward a final report to Congress to allow for
further consideration of the pen register issue.262 Knowing that detailed
information was being compiled would presumably increase judicial
awareness of the questionable uses to which pen registers can be put. In
turn, this awareness might encourage meaningful discourse on the
subject, as well as prompt Congressional action to more effectively
balance the need for vigorous law enforcement with the Fourth
Amendment’s protections.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Telephone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of their electronic communications. This expectation includes
content that takes the form of a PCTDD. The expectation is also one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. As with other forms of
communicative content, interception of PCTDDs that contain content is
not lawful on a showing of less than probable cause. For these reasons,
the collection of content on the mere relevance standard provided by the
Pen/Trap Statute should be prohibited.
Nevertheless, until Congress takes steps to do so, the
government will continue to solicit and receive court authorization to
install and use pen registers in a manner that will result in the collection
of content. The time is ripe for Congress to amend the Pen/Trap Statute
in order to cure its ambiguities and impose an effective barrier to the
continued practice of collecting PCTDDs that contain content using a
pen register.
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